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Abstract—In electricity markets with a dual-pricing scheme
for balancing energy, controllable production units typically
participate in the balancing market as “active” actors by offering
regulating energy to the system, while renewable stochastic units
are treated as “passive” participants that create imbalances and
are subject to less competitive prices. Against this background,
we propose an innovative market framework whereby the par-
ticipant in the balancing market is allowed to act as an active
agent (i.e., a provider of regulating energy) in some trading
intervals and as a passive agent (i.e., a user of regulating energy)
in some others. To illustrate and evaluate the proposed market
framework, we consider the case of a virtual power plant (VPP)
that trades in a two-settlement electricity market composed of
a day-ahead and a dual-price balancing market. We formulate
the optimal market offering problem of the VPP as a three-
stage stochastic program, where uncertainty is in the day-ahead
electricity prices, balancing prices and the power output from
the renewable units. Computational experiments show that the
VPP expected revenues can increase substantially compared to
an active-only or passive-only participation, and in the paper we
discuss how the variability of the stochastic sources affects the
balancing market participation choice.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, balancing market, virtual
power plant, offering strategy, stochastic programming
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and Sets
i, i′ ∈ I Indices of day-ahead market price scenarios
j, j′ ∈ J Indices of balancing market price scenarios
ω ∈W Index of renewable energy generation scenarios
k ∈ K Index of time intervals
ΠDA Feasible region of the day-ahead market offers
ΠAct Feasible region of the active participation
ΠPas Feasible region of the passive participation
Ω Feasible region of the VPP’s operation
Γ Feasible region of Active/Passive participation
Parameters
λDAik Day-ahead market price (e/MWh)
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λBAijk Balancing market price (e/MWh)
Eωk Wind (or solar) power generation (MWh)
E Capacity of the wind (or solar) unit (MW)
D Capacity of the thermal unit (MW)
D Minimum power limit of the thermal unit (MW)
RUP, RDW Thermal unit ramp-up and -down limits (MW/h)
P
(↑)
, P
(↓)
Charging/discharging power limits (MW)
L,L Minimum/maximum level of the storage (MWh)
η Round-trip efficiency of the energy storage
C Marginal cost of the thermal unit (e/MWh)
C0 Fixed cost of the thermal unit (e)
piDAi Probability of day-ahead price scenario i
piBAij Probability of balancing price scenario j, pro-
vided that day-ahead price scenario i realizes
piEω Probability of renewable energy production sce-
nario ω
Variables
qDAik Quantity offer at day-ahead market (MWh)
qUPijk, q
DW
ijk Up/down regulation quantity offer (MWh)
q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk Positive/negative real-time deviation (MWh)
dijωk Thermal unit energy production (MWh)
p
(↑)
ijωk, p
(↓)
ijωkCharging/discharging quantities (MWh)
`ijωk Energy storage level (MWh)
ρˆDAk Expected day-ahead market revenue (e)
ρˆActk Expected revenue of the active participation (e)
ρˆPask Expected revenue of the passive participation
(e)
cˆk Expected operational cost (e)
uijωk Commitment (binary) status of the thermal unit
ik Auxiliary binary variables to enforce comple-
mentarity of the Active/Passive participation
I. INTRODUCTION
SOCIETY is moving towards using more renewable energysources to decrease the dependency on fossil fuels. Gov-
ernments, seeking to increase the share of renewable energy,
typically support stochastic power sources such as wind and
solar power by means of subsidies. However, with the steep
growth and decreasing cost of renewable energy generation
experienced in the recent years, stochastic producers are
increasingly required to be financially responsible for the
imbalances created in the real-time. Accordingly, renewable
energy producers access the balancing electricity market as
“passive” actors by settling the deviation from the day-ahead
contracted schedule at a less favorable power price.
The imbalance of the system, often caused by forecast errors
of power demand and renewable generation, is restored by
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2rescheduling the market position of the “active” participants in
the balancing market. Such producers offer to the Transmission
System Operator (TSO) the flexibility to upward or downward
adjust their day-ahead contracted schedule, provided to be
remunerated at a more convenient price. However, to qualify as
regulators in the balancing market, generators must fulfill spe-
cific requirements from the TSO, which include the ability to
always meet the contracted schedule except for unpredictable
unit failures. As a consequence, only conventional generators
can currently be qualified as active balancing market partici-
pants. In this context, it is quite straightforward to distinguish
between passive participants (i.e., stochastic producers) that
regularly deviate from their contracted schedule, and active
participants (i.e., conventional producers) that can consistently
respect their market position and offer additional regulating
energy to the TSO.
In this context, virtual power plants (VPPs), i.e., clusters
of combined generating units, storage systems and flexible
loads that act as a single participant in the electricity market
[1], lie somehow in the middle between the two classes of
stochastic and conventional generators. There is an increasing
interest towards VPPs that is associated with the possibility of
internally handling the forecast errors caused by renewable en-
ergy units. However, we believe that VPPs have more potential
than solely self-balancing their stochastic energy production.
Specifically, if VPPs were able to provide regulating energy
to the TSO, when available, then they would bring a major
benefit to the operation of the system. Indeed, a VPP often
uses only a portion of its flexibility to balance the stochastic
power production within the cluster, and additional flexibility
could be used to compensate for the imbalance created by
renewable energy generation outside the cluster. This potential
is not exploited by the TSO due to the current balancing
market setup, which enforces a clear distinction between active
and passive participation in the balancing market. This results
in classifying a VPP that includes stochastic generation as a
passive participant, since it can hardly fulfill the qualification
procedure for being an active regulator.
In this paper, we propose an innovative and more flexible
market framework where we loosen the TSO’s requirements
for producers to qualify as active participants in the balancing
market. Specifically, our idea is to allow VPPs, and market
participants in general, to actively sell regulating energy in
some trading intervals and passively deviate from their sched-
ule in others. This relaxes the duality between only-active
and only-passive participation, and allows to exploit the full
potential of VPPs in electricity markets. What we propose can
be seen as a new “market product” or “market bid format”,
called Active/Passive offers, tailored to the characteristics of
VPPs. Note that market products that accommodate the needs
of a specific technology are not uncommon. For instance, the
“linked block orders” in the Nord Pool market are designed
for conventional generators that want to include start-up and/or
shut-down costs within their market offers. It is worth spec-
ifying that this new market product considers the potential
reliability issues arising from breaking the distinction between
active and passive actors. Indeed, VPPs that commit to sell
regulating energy during a trading interval are prevented from
creating an imbalance in the same interval.
To illustrate and evaluate the potential impact of the pro-
posed balancing market framework, we take the perspective
of a VPP offering in a two-settlement electricity market
that allows for Active/Passive offers. Our goal is determining
whether VPPs would gain from actively offering regulating
energy, or would instead choose to behave as passive actors.
In the remainder of this section, we presents the literature
review on optimal offering and modeling of VPPs in electricity
markets in Section I-A. Section I-B presents our approach and
the contributions of this work. Finally, Section I-C describes
the structure of the paper.
A. Literature Review
The problem of determining the optimal market offer for
a stochastic power producer has been widely studied in the
literature. In [2], [3], and [4], the optimal quantity to be
submitted in the day-ahead market is derived as a quantile
of the probability distribution of the future wind or solar
power production. This idea is extended in [5] including
the correlation between future wind production and real-
time prices. In [6], the optimal offering strategy for a wind
power producer is solved using stochastic programming. These
models consider the stochastic producer as a passive actor in
the balancing market, i.e., the balancing stage is only used to
settle deviations from the day-ahead contracted schedule.
Similarly, several models have been developed to derive the
optimal offering strategy for a conventional production unit. In
[7], [8], and [9], the feasible operating region of a thermal unit
is formulated using a mixed-integer linear program (MILP).
Other papers (e.g., [10], [11], [12], and [13]) combine such
operating region with an electricity market trading problem
obtaining different offering strategies. In contrast to stochastic
units, conventional units are modeled as active participants in
the balancing market, i.e., they access the balancing market to
offer regulating energy to the system operator.
The optimal participation of a VPP in an electricity market
has been less investigated. In [14], a direct load control algo-
rithm is used for managing an aggregate of controllable loads.
A deterministic offering model for a cluster consisting of
combined heat and power units and a wind farm participating
in a dual-price balancing market is given in [15]. Similarly,
[16] presents a comparative (deterministic) study to reduce
the real-time imbalances of a VPP composed of combined heat
and power units and PV solar units. Papers [17] and [18] study
the bidding problem of a VPP composed of dispatchable units
in a joint market for energy and reserve. The authors consider a
deterministic setting and formulate a mixed-integer non-linear
program solved using a genetic algorithm. In [19], a VPP
offering strategy is formulated as a unit commitment problem
where point estimates are used to model the uncertainty in
market prices and power generation. Reference [20] proposes
a stochastic MILP to derive the optimal self-scheduling of a
VPP, considering a weekly time horizon and including long-
term bilateral contracts and technical constraints of the units.
Subsequently, the authors of [21] develop a two-stage stochas-
tic offering model to maximize the expected profit of a VPP
3with uncertainty in electricity prices and power production.
Other works, e.g., [22], include the electricity market clearing
process within the optimal offering strategy, resulting in a
hierarchical stochastic optimization model. Finally, we refer to
[1] for a general VPP modeling approach in which different
combinations of generating units, flexible loads, and storage
systems are examined.
B. Contributions
The contribution of our paper is threefold:
i Conceptual contribution. We propose a new market prod-
uct, or market bid format, called Active/Passive offers,
tailored to the characteristics of VPPs. This innovative
market product has the potential to fully exploit the
flexibility of the dispatchable generators of a VPP, i.e.,
balancing the forecast errors of the stochastic power units
both within and outside the VPP cluster. Our proposed
market product could also be adapted or extended to more
“sophisticated” products, e.g., the TSO may require the
VPP to operate in the same mode (either active or passive)
for at least a given number of trading intervals.
ii Modeling contribution. We develop the optimal offering
strategy for a VPP in an electricity market that allows for
the novel Active/Passive offers. Our new market concept
forces to rethink the VPP strategy and has a serious
impact on the mathematical formulation. Indeed, the VPP
offering strategies from the extant literature model the
VPP either as a passive balancing market actor (e.g.,
[14], [15], [16], [19], [20], [21] and [22]) which solely
settles the real-time deviations that are not self-balanced,
or as an active actor (e.g., [17] and [18]) that can only
sell regulating energy and is not allowed to deviate
from the contracted schedule. In contrast, we account for
the Active/Passive participation by developing a three-
stage stochastic program with recourse, which is more
involved than the offering strategies from the literature
(usually deterministic or two-stage stochastic programs).
The Active/Passive offering strategies also require addi-
tional binary variables and new constraints to enforce
the complementarity between the active and the passive
participation. This has an impact on the computational
time needed to derive the operating strategy and should
be thus accounted for when considering introducing the
Active/Passive offers in an electricity market.
iii Practical impact. In addition to proposing a new concept
(i.e., Active/Passive offers) and a new model (i.e., bidding
strategy with Active/Passive offers), we also validate
numerically the interest of VPPs towards such offers. Our
case studies show that (i) the VPP is often willing to
actively sell regulating energy, and (ii) the Active/Passive
offer always outperforms the active-only and passive-only
strategy in terms of expected revenues. This increased
profitability may also encourage the aggregation of dif-
ferent technologies into a VPP.
C. Paper Structure
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start in
Section II by presenting the electricity market framework, the
VPP structure, and characterizing the uncertainty. In Section
III, we formulate the Active/Passive offering strategy as a
three-stage stochastic program. Section IV gives an explana-
tory example and Section V compares the Active/Passive offer-
ing strategy with the Passive and Active strategies for different
VPP configurations. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. MARKET FRAMEWORK AND MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
A. Electricity Market Framework
We consider a two-settlement electricity market composed
of a day-ahead and a balancing market. The day-ahead market
is cleared at noon for all 24 hourly trading intervals of
the following day. The accepted day-ahead market offers are
settled under a uniform pricing scheme. Subsequently, closer
to the real-time operation, a separate balancing market is
cleared for each hourly interval, one hour before operation.
At the balancing stage the active participants submit their
offers, in the form of non-decreasing offer curves, for the
provision of regulating energy to the TSO. The accepted offers
are priced under a uniform pricing scheme. Specifically, if an
active participant submits an up-regulation offer of quantity
qUPk during interval k, this is accepted if the system actually
requires up-regulation, and the offered price is lower than the
balancing market price λBAk (merit order). If these conditions
are satisfied, then the active participant receives an income of
λBAk q
UP
k . Similarly, a down-regulation offer of quantity q
DW
k
at k is accepted if the system needs down-regulation, and the
offered price is higher than λBAk , resulting in a cash flow of
−λBAk qDWk .
Passive participants inform the TSO of their deviations from
the contracted schedule. Such deviations are priced under a
dual-price imbalance settlement scheme, i.e., a different price
for positive (extra-production) and negative (under-production)
deviations ([1], [6]). If the passive participant generates a
positive deviation q(+)k , the associated income is λ
(+)
k q
(+)
k ,
where λ(+)k is given by
λ
(+)
k =
{
λDAk , if λ
BA
k ≥ λDAk
λBAk , otherwise
i.e., the least convenient price between λDAk and λ
BA
k . Simi-
larly, a negative deviation q(−)k generates a revenue −λ(−)k q(−)k ,
with λ(−)k given by
λ
(−)
k =
{
λBAk , if λ
BA
k ≥ λDAk
λDAk , otherwise
i.e., again, the least convenient price between λDAk and λ
BA
k .
For a more extended discussion on the dual-pricing mecha-
nism, we refer the interested reader to [5] and [23].
This balancing market structure (i.e., uniform pricing for
settling active offers and dual-pricing for passive deviations)
is widely used across Europe, e.g., in Spain, Portugal, and
Denmark among other countries [24]. Our novel Active/Passive
market model thus adapts to one of the major market contexts.
Notice that the contracted schedule of active participants
is rigid and deviations are not allowed in our market model.
In practice, small output deviations from the schedule are
4DA BA
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the VPP structure highlighting the energy exchanged
with the electricity market platform.
sometimes tolerated, mainly in balancing markets with shorter
trading intervals (e.g., 5 minutes). However, this relaxation
should not be considered in the offering strategy of an active
participant, as it is usually introduced to account for possible
control errors in the real-time operation of the power units.
B. VPP structure
We consider a VPP composed of a stochastic power unit
(either wind or solar), a conventional thermal unit, and an
electric energy storage. The structure of the VPP is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The power production of the stochastic unit and
the thermal unit are denoted by Ek and dk, respectively. The
storage unit produces energy when discharging and consumes
energy during the charging phase; the amount of charging and
discharging power is denoted by p(↑)k and p
(↓)
k , respectively.
The total amount of energy production (or consumption) of
the VPP has to match the amount of energy exchanged with
the electricity market platform. The energy quantity contracted
in the day-ahead market is denoted by qDAk . We then indicate
with qUPk and q
DW
k the upward and downward adjustments in
the balancing market, respectively, which are associated with
an active participation at the balancing stage. Alternatively, the
VPP can create a positive q(+)k or negative q
(−)
k deviation in the
real-time. Thus, under the Active/Passive participation model,
the “deterministic” energy balance at the hourly interval k
between the VPP production (or consumption) and the quantity
exchanged with the market platform can be expressed by
qDAk + q
UP
k − qDWk + q(+)k − q(−)k = Ek + dk + p(↓)k − p(↑)k .
The VPP is assumed price-taker in both the day-ahead and
the balancing market. Accordingly, the market prices within its
offering strategy are exogenous and uncertain, and modeled by
means of a set of scenarios. We also assume that the different
technologies within the VPP are owned by the same company,
thus, in this paper we do not investigate how to eventually
redistribute the VPP profit among its components.
C. Scenario Generation
To derive the offering strategy, the VPP is provided with an
input set of scenarios describing the evolution of uncertain
market prices and power production from the wind or PV
power unit. We generate such scenarios starting from proba-
bilistic forecasts. The probabilistic forecasts for the day-ahead
and the balancing market prices are obtained through the fun-
damental market model proposed in [25], where parametrized
supply and demand curves are used to simulate the market
clearing mechanism. Then, by introducing uncertainty in one
or more parameters of the two curves, we obtain probabilistic
forecasts of the day-ahead and balancing market prices. For
wind and PV power production we instead use the dataset of
probabilistic forecasts, respectively, from [25] and [26].
Probabilistic forecasts describe an estimate of the random
variable density function for each look-ahead time, without
any inter-temporal correlation. To include temporal dependen-
cies, starting from the probabilistic forecasts we generate a set
of trajectories following the methodology presented in [27] and
[28]. In brief, series of forecast errors are converted into a mul-
tivariate Gaussian random variable, and a unique covariance
matrix is used to describe the interdependence structure. We
model this covariance matrix using an exponential covariance
function [28] where the exponential parameter controls the
correlation among the lead times. Accordingly, the day-ahead
market prices λDAk are represented by the set of trajectories
{λDAik : i ∈ I, k ∈ K}. Then, for each day-ahead scenario i,
the balancing market prices λBAk are modeled using a set J of
scenarios {λBAijk : i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K}. Finally, the uncertain
power production Ek from the stochastic unit is represented
by the set of trajectories {Eωk : ω ∈W,k ∈ K}.
The number of scenarios needed to accurately represent
continuous random variables or stochastic processes is usually
large, leading to intractable stochastic programs. Therefore, we
use the technique of [29] to reduce the number of scenarios
while preserving most of the stochastic information.
III. OPTIMAL OFFERING STRATEGY THROUGH
MULTI-STAGE STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING
At noon, the VPP submits its day-ahead market offers to the
market operator, aiming to maximize its total expected profit.
While determining the optimal day-ahead market offers, the
VPP also takes into account the uncertainty, and endogenously
models the future decisions in the balancing market. This
qDAk
λDAik q
UP
ik , q
DW
ik
Eωk q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk
λBAijk
λBAijk
Eωk q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk
λBAijk
λBAijk
λDAik q
UP
ik , q
DW
ik
Eωk q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk
λBAijk
λBAijk
Eωk q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk
λBAijk
λBAijk
first
stage
second
stage
third
stage
decisions
uncertainty
disclosure
Fig. 2. Representation of the multi-stage stochastic programming setup.
5results in a three-stage stochastic programming framework that
we illustrate in Fig. 2. The day-ahead quantity offers, qDAk , are
modeled as first-stage decisions. Then, at the second stage,
the VPP owner makes the decision of being active or passive.
Specifically, at the second stage, the day-ahead market price
λDAik for hour k is known and the VPP decides whether it will
be active or passive in hour k. If the chosen behavior is active,
then, still at the second stage, the VPP submits its offering
curves to the balancing market for up- or down-regulation.
Therefore, the up- and down-regulation adjustments qUPik and
qDWik are second-stage decision variables that are chosen after
the day-ahead market prices λDAk realize but before the power
production Ek is known. In contrast, if the chosen behavior is
passive, then the VPP does not offer regulating energy to the
balancing market but instead it will settle the imbalances in
the third stage, which means that the positive and negative
deviations q(+)iωk and q
(−)
iωk are third-stage decisions that are
made after the disclosure of λDAk and Ek.
Following the methodology presented in [12] and [25], we
make the day-ahead quantities qDAk scenario i dependent (i.e.,
qDAk → qDAik ) to build the non-decreasing offer curves. Despite
being built using scenario-dependent price-quantity offers, the
curves adapt to any realization of the uncertainty and are, in
fact, scenario-independent (the non-anticipativity structure of
our stochastic program is not violated). Similarly, the up- and
down-regulation adjustments qUPik and q
DW
ik are made index j
dependent (i.e., qUPik → qUPijk and qDWik → qDWijk ) to derive the
offer curves in the balancing market. Finally, we make the VPP
operational variables dependent on indices i, j, and ω (e.g.,
dk → dijωk and p(↑)k → p(↑)ijωk). To derive its day-ahead market
offers, the VPP solves the following optimization model
max
Ξ
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
Act
k + ρˆ
Pas
k − cˆk (1a)
s.t. qDAik + q
UP
ijk − qDWijk + q(+)iωk − q(−)iωk =
Eωk + dijωk + p
(↑)
ijωk − p(↓)ijωk, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k
(1b)(
ρˆDAk , q
DA
ik
) ∈ ΠDA, ∀i,∀k (1c)(
ρˆActk , q
UP
ijk, q
DW
ijk
) ∈ ΠAct, ∀i,∀j,∀k (1d)(
ρˆPask , q
(+)
ijk , q
(−)
ijk
)
∈ ΠPas, ∀i,∀ω,∀k (1e)(
dijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk
)
∈ Ω, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (1f)
cˆk = h({dijωk, ∀i,∀j,∀ω}) , ∀k (1g)(
qUPijk, q
DW
ijk , q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk
)
∈ Γ, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (1h)
where Ξ =
{
ρˆDAk , ρˆ
Act
k , ρˆ
Pas
k , cˆk, q
DA
ik , q
UP
ijk, q
DW
ijk ,
q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk , dijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk
}
.
The objective function (1a) maximizes the VPP expected
revenues considering both the day-ahead and balancing mar-
kets. Constraint (1b) imposes the energy balance between the
VPP production (or consumption) and the energy exchanged
with the electricity market. The sets of constraints (1c)-(1h)
are expressed and discussed in detail in the following.
A. Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set of constraints (1c), denoted by ΠDA, computes the
expected profit from the day-ahead market ρˆDAk and includes
constraints on the day-ahead offer curve. It is written as
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
piDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k (2a)
qDAik ≥ qDAi′k if λDAik ≥ λDAi′k , ∀i,∀i′,∀k (2b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i,∀i′,∀k (2c)
− P (↑) ≤ qDAik ≤ D + E + P
(↓)
, ∀i,∀i′,∀k. (2d)
Constraint (2a) yields the expected income of the VPP as-
sociated with the day-ahead market offer curves. Constraints
(2b) and (2c) force the offer curves to be, respectively,
non-decreasing and non-anticipative. Finally, constraints (2d)
restrict the day-ahead offer quantities to the VPP capacity.
B. Linear Formulation of ΠAct
The constraints (1d), denoted by ΠAct, yield the expected
profit ρˆActk from an active participation in the balancing
market, and comprises constraints on the offer curves in the
balancing market. They are formulated as
ρˆActk =
∑
ij
piDAi pi
BA
j λ
BA
ijk
(
qUPijk − qDWijk
)
, ∀k (3a)
qUPijk ≥ qUPij′k if λBAijk ≥ λBAij′k, ∀i, ∀j,∀j′,∀k (3b)
qUPijk = q
UP
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i,∀j,∀j′,∀k (3c)
qDWijk ≤ qDWij′k if λBAijk ≥ λBAij′k, ∀i,∀j,∀j′,∀k (3d)
qDWijk = q
DW
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i,∀j,∀j′,∀k (3e)
qUPijk = 0 if down-regulation in (i, j) at k, ∀i,∀j,∀k (3f)
qDWijk = 0 if up-regulation in (i, j) at k, ∀i,∀j,∀k (3g)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk ≥ 0, ∀i,∀j,∀k. (3h)
Constraint (3a) evaluates the expected revenue from the sub-
mission of offer curves in the balancing market as an active
participant. Constraints (3b) and (3c) ensure, respectively non-
decreasing shape and non-anticipativity of the up-regulation
offer curve. Similarly, constraints (3d) and (3e) do the same
for the down-regulation offer curve. Constraints (3f) and (3g)
impose the offer type (up- or down-regulation) based on
the direction of the system imbalance, information that is
embedded in each scenario (i, j) at interval k. Nevertheless,
in the case study of Section V, we make the simplifying
assumption (also made in [25]) that the TSO requires down-
regulation in (i, j) at k if and only if λBAijk < λ
DA
ik , and up-
regulation if and only if λBAijk > λ
DA
ik , that is, we assume that
the system’s need for up- or down-regulation can be directly
inferred from the difference between λDAik and λ
BA
ijk . Note that
situations in which this is not true are infrequent in real-word
dual-price balancing markets. Furthermore, the benefits the
VPP could make from trying to anticipate these rare events
when offering in the day-ahead market would not compensate
for the high costs such an endeavor would involve in terms
of computational and modeling effort and the risk of a wrong
guess. Finally, constraint (3h) enforces qUPijk and q
DW
ijk to be
non-negative variables.
6C. Linear Formulation of ΠPas
The constraints (1e), denoted by ΠPas, give the expected
profit ρˆPask associated with a passive participation in the
balancing market. They are formulated as
ρˆPask =
∑
ijω
piDAi pi
BA
j pi
E
ω
(
λ
(+)
ijk q
(+)
iωk − λ(−)ijk q(−)iωk
)
, ∀k (4a)
q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk ≥ 0, ∀i,∀ω,∀k (4b)
where λ(+)ijk = min
(
λBAijk , λ
DA
ik
)
and λ(−)ijk = max
(
λBAijk , λ
DA
ik
)
,
in accordance with the dual-price imbalance settlement scheme
[1], [6]. Constraint (4a) computes the expected income from
a passive participation in the balancing stage and accounts for
the imbalances created. Constraint (4b) ensures that q(+)iωk and
q
(−)
iωk are non-negative variables.
D. MILP Formulation of Ω
The constraints (1f), denoted by Ω, establish the feasible
operating region of the VPP and are formulated as
`ijωk = `ijω(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
ijωk − p(↓)ijωk, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5a)
L ≤ `ijωk ≤ L, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5b)
0 ≤ p(↑)ijωk ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5c)
0 ≤ p(↓)ijωk ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5d)
uijωkD ≤ dijωk ≤ uijωkD, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5e)
dijωk − dijω(k−1) ≤ RUP, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5f)
dijω(k−1) − dijωk ≤ RDW, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k (5g)
uijωk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∀j,∀ω,∀k. (5h)
Constraint (5a) represents the energy balance of the storage
unit. Constraint (5b) forces the level of energy in the stor-
age `ijωk to lie between its minimum and maximum limits.
Similarly, constraints (5c) and (5d) do the same for p(↑)ijωk and
p
(↓)
ijωk, respectively. Constraint (5e) imposes the thermal unit
to operate within its minimum output and its capacity when
on-line (i.e., uijωk = 1) and not to produce when off-line (i.e.,
uijωk = 0). Constraints (5f) and (5g) enforce, respectively, the
upward and downward ramping limitations of the thermal unit.
Finally, constraint (5h) sets the commitment status uijωk of the
thermal unit as a binary variable. Constraint (5a) requires the
initial level of the storage as input, and constraints (5f)-(5g)
need the initial production level of the thermal unit.
Richer models for the feasible operating region of a dis-
patchable unit exist in the literature. However, to keep the fo-
cus on the Active/Passive offering strategy and its formulation
intuitive, we chose to capture the main operating constraints
of the unit limiting the level of details of the model.
E. MILP Formulation of h(·)
Constraint (1g) computes the expected production cost cˆk
associated with the thermal unit. A possible mixed-integer
linear programming formulation of this cost function is (6)
cˆk =
∑
ijω
piDAi pi
BA
j pi
E
ω (C0uijωk + Cdijωk) , ∀k (6)
where C0 is the fixed cost incurred when the unit is on, and
C is the marginal production cost of the unit.
F. MILP Formulation of Γ
The set of constraints (1h), denoted by Γ, enforces comple-
mentarity between the active and passive participation in the
balancing market. Γ can be formulated as
qUPijk + q
DW
ijk ≤ ikM, ∀i,∀j,∀k (7a)
q
(+)
iωk + q
(−)
iωk ≤ (1− ik)M, ∀i,∀ω,∀k (7b)
ik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∀k. (7c)
Constraints (7a) and (7b) force the VPP to be in only one state
between active (i.e., ik = 1) and passive (i.e., ik = 0) in the
balancing market, through the so-called big-M approach. A
natural and sensible choice for the parameter M can be
M := E +D + P
(↑)
+ P
(↓)
.
Finally, constraint (7c) forces the variables ik to be binary.
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, we present a stylized example to better
illustrate the potential contribution of enabling Active/Passive
offers in the balancing market. We analyze the offering strat-
egy of a VPP composed of a wind farm of capacity E = 40
MW and a conventional generation unit of capacity D = 25
MW, minimum output D = 0 MW, and marginal cost C = 31
e/MWh (C0 = 0 e). This example considers 2 trading
intervals (k1,k2), 1 day-ahead price scenario, 2 balancing-
market price scenarios (j1,j2), and 2 wind power production
scenarios (ω1,ω2). The values of λDAk , λ
BA
jk (and the associated
λ
(+)
jk and λ
(−)
jk ), and Eωk are given in Table I. Note that the
balancing scenarios j1 and j2 have the same probability of
realization, likewise the wind production scenarios ω1 and ω2,
i.e., piBAj1 = pi
BA
j2
= 0.5 and piEω1 = pi
E
ω2 = 0.5.
TABLE I
PRICES AND WIND PRODUCTION SCENARIOS.
λDAk λ
BA
jk λ
(+)
ωk λ
(−)
ωk Eωk
(e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (MWh)
j1 j2 j1 j2 j1 j2 ω1 ω2
k1 25 26 23 25 23 26 25 5 18
k2 29 19 37 19 29 29 37 9 15
The optimal VPP offers under the current balancing market
framework, i.e. passive-only, are shown in Table II. The VPP
deviates -13 MWh at k1 if scenario ω1 realizes. Differently,
TABLE II
DECISIONS WITH PASSIVE STRATEGY.
qDAk k q
UP
jk q
DW
jk q
(+)
ωk q
(−)
ωk
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
j1 j2 j1 j2 ω1 ω2 ω1 ω2
k1 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0
k2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7at interval k2 it relies on the dispatchable units to balance
the wind production uncertainty. Note that this behavior is
linked to how different λBAjk is expected to be from λ
DA
k .
If these are “close” as in k1, it may be convenient to use
the market to compensate for the uncertainty in Eωk. At k1,
Eωk will be either 5 or 18 MWh, and the VPP schedules
qDAk1 = 18 MWh, receiving a day-ahead income ρˆ
DA
k1
of
450 e (λDAk1 × qDAk1 ). In scenario ω2 there is no need for
balancing, while in ω1 the VPP is short of 13 MWh. In this
case, the VPP can either deviate -13 MWh or generate 13
MWh with the conventional unit. A deviation of -13 MWh is
priced at 26 e/MWh under scenario j1 or 25 e/MWh under
scenario j2, with an associated income of −338 e and −325
e, respectively. With the associated probabilities this results
in ρˆPask1 of -165.75 e (pi
E
ω1 × (piBAj1 λ
(−)
j1k1
+piBAj2 λ
(−)
j2k1
)× q(−)ω1k1 ),
yielding a total expected profit of 284.25 e. Using the thermal
unit to produce these 13 MWh costs 403 e, yielding an
expected profit of 248.25 e, which is less convenient. At k2,
the balancing price λBAjk is likely to be “far” from λ
DA
k , and
the VPP contracts qDAk2 = 15 MWh, which gives a day-ahead
income of 435 e. When ω2 realizes the wind farm produces
15 MWh, thus matching the day-ahead quantity offer. Under
scenario ω1, Eωk is 9 MWh and the VPP can either produce
6 MWh with the conventional unit, or deviate in the balancing
market. The expected cost of producing 6 MWh is 93 e.
Differently, relying on the balancing market yields an expected
income ρˆPask3 of -111 e, associated with q
(−)
ω1k2
= 6 MWh.
Then, the decision of producing using the thermal unit is more
convenient. Note that if λBAj2k2 would have been “closer” to
λDAk2 , e.g., λ
BA
j2k2
= 30 e/MWh, then it would have been more
profitable to settle q(−)ω1k2 = 6 MWh in the balancing market.
Under the Active/Passive model (see Table III), the VPP
offers regulation to the market during interval k2, i.e., when it
does not rely on the market to balance its position. At k2, the
VPP increases its day-ahead offer in 19 MWh (with respect
to what the VPP does in passive-only mode), which gives
an additional day-ahead income of 551 e. Producing such 19
MWh is needed only in scenario j2 and the associated expected
cost is 294.5 e. Differently, under scenario j1 it submits a
down-regulation offer qDWj1k2 = 19 MWh, which is priced at 19
e/MWh. This generates an expected income ρˆActj1k2 of -180.5 e
(negative as it is a down-regulation offer), but avoids the cost
of producing the 19 MWh (under scenario j1). In total, this
gives an extra expected profit of 76 e, i.e., 551−294.5−180.5,
at k2 with respect to the passive-only strategy.
TABLE III
DECISIONS WITH ACTIVE/PASSIVE STRATEGY.
qDAk k q
UP
jk q
DW
jk q
(+)
ωk q
(−)
ωk
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
j1 j2 j1 j2 ω1 ω2 ω1 ω2
k1 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0
k2 34 1 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0
This small examples shows that both the VPP and the TSO
can benefit from enabling the proposed Active/Passive strategy
in the balancing market. Indeed, the VPP can increase its
expected revenues and the TSO can have more regulating
flexibility. This example also gives some additional insights.
Generally speaking, a balancing market price λBAjk which is
much higher than the day-ahead price λDAk is typically associ-
ated with a significant lack of production in the system, and a
λBAjk much lower than λ
DA
k to a large excess of production at
time k. Conversely, when λBAjk is “close” to λ
DA
k , the system
imbalance is likely to be small. We have noticed that the VPP
is willing to be passive when λBAjk and λ
DA
k are “close”, and
active when they are “far”. Accordingly, the VPP would create
deviations when the system imbalance is easier to restore, and
provide regulating flexibility when more needed by the TSO.
V. CASE STUDY
Next we present a case study to test the offering strategy
of Section III. The aim is to analyze whether the proposed
Active/Passive balancing participation setup may drive the
VPP to offer its flexibility when available.
The scenarios provided as input to the offering model are
generated as described in Section II-C. First, we generate 300
scenarios for the day-ahead market price λDAik and keep the ten
most representative ones. Then, for each day-ahead scenario
i, we randomly sample 300 scenarios of the balancing market
price λBAik and select the six most significant. Finally, we
generate 300 trajectories of the renewable energy production
Eωk (wind or solar power) and keep the five most repre-
sentative. This results in a scenario tree with 300 branches
(10× 6× 5). The parameters of the thermal unit are shown in
Table IV. Similarly, the characteristics of the storage unit are
presented in Table V. The programs are modeled in PYTHON
environment and solved to optimality with GUROBI.
The Active/Passive offering strategy is compared against two
benchmarks: a Passive and an Active offering strategy. Based
on the Passive approach, the VPP is assumed to be always a
passive participant in the balancing market. Differently, under
the Active strategy, the VPP is an active actor in the balancing
stage for the entire trading horizon. These two alternative
models can be derived from the optimization model (1) by
fixing the binary variables ik = 0, ∀i, ∀k for the Passive
strategy, or ik = 1, ∀i,∀k for the Active one.
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS OF THE THERMAL UNIT.
D D RUP RDW C0 C
(MW) (MW) (MW/h) (MW/h) (e) (e/MWh)
0 70 30 30 0 45
TABLE V
PARAMETERS OF THE ELECTRIC STORAGE UNIT.
L L P
(↑)
P
(↓)
η
(MWh) (MWh) (MW) (MW)
0 80 30 30 0.81
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Fig. 3. Input day-ahead market price (top), balancing price (middle), and
wind power production scenarios (bottom) to the offering model.
A. VPP with wind farm
Fig. 3 shows the ten selected trajectories for the day-ahead
market price λDAik , the six chosen balancing price scenarios
λBAijk for a sample day-ahead trajectory i, and the five selected
trajectories for the wind power production Eωk (in p.u.).
The wind farm capacity E is initially set to 50 MW. We
solve the Active/Passive offering model (1) using as input the
scenarios shown in Fig. 3. The complementarity between the
active/passive choice is enforced through the binary variables
ik. If ik = 1, the VPP is predicting to act as an active partici-
pant during the interval k of the balancing stage, provided that
the day-ahead price scenario i realizes. For the same scenario i
and interval k, if ik = 0, then the VPP is expecting to behave
passively. Being ∗ik the optimal solution, then the probability
that the VPP will be active is computed as
∑
i pi
DA
i 
∗
ik, and the
probability that it will be passive as
∑
i pi
DA
i (1− ∗ik). These
probabilities are illustrated in Fig. 4.
From midnight to 10 a.m., the VPP will decide to be either
active or passive depending on the day-ahead price realization
i. On one hand, the uncertainty in the wind power production
is limited in this trading interval, which would benefit an active
approach as the flexibility of the controllable units could be
used to offer regulating energy. On the other hand, even if
uncertain, the spread between the balancing price scenarios
and the day-ahead prices is also limited, leading consequently
Fig. 4. Probability of being active vs. passive (E = 50 MW).
Fig. 5. Day-ahead market offer curves at k = 15 (E = 50 MW).
to low additional profits resulting from an active participation.
Then, from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m., the VPP decides to be a
passive participant for each realization i of the day-ahead
price. Indeed, the uncertainty in the balancing market prices
is limited while the amount of wind power production is
very uncertain. Finally, from 6 p.m. to midnight, the VPP is
almost sure to sell regulating energy in the balancing market.
This translates into internally handling the forecasting error
of wind power production, which is highly uncertain in these
time intervals as it can vary from 20% to almost 80% of
the wind farm capacity. However, the balancing market price
scenarios are going to be far-off the day-ahead market price
with high probability; accordingly, passive deviations from
the day-ahead schedule may result in heavy penalties, while
selling regulating energy can be very profitable.
As an example, Fig. 5 illustrates the day-ahead market
offer curves for the interval k = 15 obtained when using
the Active/Passive strategy (left), Active strategy (middle),
and Passive strategy (right). Note that the output of offering
model (1) is a discrete set of price-quantity pairs (qDAik , λ
DA
ik ).
To obtain the step functions of Fig. 5 starting from the set
of price-quantity pairs, we use the standard methodology
presented in [12] and [25]. From Fig. 5, we note that the Active
approach appears to be less “reactive” to the day-ahead market
price compared to the other strategies, and no additional
quantity is scheduled for high values of the day-ahead market
price. Indeed, the position of the VPP after the day-ahead
market affects its capability to internally compensate for the
wind power uncertainty. Therefore, the VPP position is more
constrained and driven by feasibility limitations compared to
the other two strategies.
Finally, in Table VI we compare the expected profit of the
three offering models for different values of the wind farm ca-
pacity E, ranging from 10 to 90 MW. When E = 10 MW, the
expected profit increment under the Active/Passive approach is
0.6% and 8.1% compared to the Active and Passive strategies,
respectively. In effect, if the capacity of the stochastic unit
is small, then the VPP can internally handle most of the
wind power deviations and offer its regulating energy into the
balancing market. Accordingly, the increase in profit compared
to the Active strategy is limited whereas the Passive strategy
is strongly outperformed. This trend progressively changes as
the wind farm capacity E increases. As E grows, the VPP
based on an Active/Passive participation is more likely to settle
deviations in the balancing stage and has less flexibility to offer
in the balancing market. When E = 90 MW, the increase
9in profit is 4.6% compared to the Active strategy and 2.1%
compared to the Passive one.
TABLE VI
EXPECTED PROFIT FOR THE THREE OFFERING STRATEGIES FOR
DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE WIND FARM CAPACITY E .
E (MW) Expected profit (103 e)
Active/Passive Active Passive
10 18.16 18.06 16.81
30 22.89 22.48 21.69
50 27.59 26.85 26.57
70 32.35 31.16 31.45
90 37.07 35.44 36.32
B. VPP with PV solar
Fig. 6 shows the ten selected trajectories for the day-ahead
market price λDAik , the six chosen balancing price scenarios
λBAijk for a sample day-ahead trajectory i, and the five selected
trajectories for the solar power production Eωk (in p.u.).
The PV solar unit is initially considered with capacity E =
50 MW. We run the Active/Passive offering model (1), and
in Fig. 7 show the probabilities of the VPP being active and
passive in the trading horizon, computed as in Section V-A.
From midnight to 6 a.m. and from 8 p.m. to midnight, the VPP
decides to be active in the balancing market for each day-ahead
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
λ
D
A
(e
/M
W
h
)
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
λ
B
A
(e
/M
W
h
)
λDA
λBA
4 8 12 16 20 24
k (h)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
so
la
r
p
ow
er
E
(p
.u
.)
Fig. 6. Input day-ahead market price (top), balancing price (middle), and PV
solar power production scenarios (bottom) to the offering model.
Fig. 7. Probability of being active vs. passive (E = 50 MW).
Fig. 8. Day-ahead market offer curves at k = 5. (E = 50 MW).
scenario i. Indeed, these time intervals are before and after the
sunset, and the VPP is certain that the output of its PV solar
unit will be zero. Differently, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., the VPP
is almost sure that it will passively deviate from its contracted
schedule to compensate for the forecasting error of the PV
solar unit. In this time horizon, the PV power production is
very uncertain (e.g., at 2 p.m. it can vary from 20% to 70% of
the unit capacity), and it is more convenient to settle deviations
in the balancing market. Finally, from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., the
VPP will decide whether the active or the passive participation
is more profitable depending on the day-ahead price realization
i, and the associated amount of energy contracted. In this time
interval, the uncertainty of the PV solar production is in fact
limited, which would suggest that an active participation may
be preferable. However, the possibility of gaining extra profits
from the balancing market is low as the balancing market price
scenarios are very close to the day-ahead price. Differently,
from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., an active participation is more attractive
since the balancing market price scenarios give the opportunity
to gain extra profits.
In Fig. 8, we plot the day-ahead market offer curves from
the three VPP strategies Active/Passive (left), Active (middle),
and Passive (right) at k = 5. In this interval, the offer
curves derived for the Active/Passive and Active strategy are
equivalent, which is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 7
where the VPP decides to be always active from midnight
to 6 a.m.. Compared to these two models, the Passive one
scheduled more energy in the day-ahead as the VPP is less
driven by feasibility constraints.
Lastly, we compare the expected profit obtained with the
three offering models for increasing capacity of the PV unit,
E, from 10 to 90 MW. We show the results in Table VII.
When E = 10 MW, the expected profit of the Active/Passive
and the Active approach are similar. Indeed, as the capacity
TABLE VII
EXPECTED PROFIT FOR THE THREE OFFERING STRATEGIES FOR
DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE PV SOLAR UNIT CAPACITY E .
E (MW) Expected profit (103 e)
Active/Passive Active Passive
10 18.59 18.27 17.54
30 22.19 21.28 21.15
50 25.79 24.24 24.76
70 29.39 27.17 28.36
90 32.98 30.08 31.97
10
of the PV unit is small, the VPP can easily handle the PV
solar uncertainty internally and offer the remaining flexibility
in the balancing market. The expected profit increase under
the Active/Passive approach is 1.7% and 6.0% compared to the
Active and the Passive strategies, respectively. As the PV unit
capacity increases, the Passive strategy becomes more com-
petitive as it can benefit from a more flexible VPP operation,
and can consequently contract more profitable positions in the
day-ahead market. Instead, as E grows, the Active approach
becomes increasingly constrained in its operation. First, it has
less flexibility to offer in the balancing stage as it needs to
allocate it to balance the PV unit forecasting errors. Second,
the day-ahead position is more constrained by ensuring a
feasible real-time operation, thus it is less driven by the market
prices.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed an innovative participation model
for the balancing market, denoted by Active/Passive, aimed to
increase the flexibility of market participants as well as the
amount of regulating energy available to the TSO in the real-
time. Specifically, we suggest to allow market agents such
as VPPs to actively offer regulating energy in time intervals
where they can ensure to internally handle the eventual fore-
casting errors of the stochastic energy sources, while passively
deviating from their day-ahead schedule in other intervals. We
enforced these two participation modes (active and passive)
to be complementary, and agents submitting regulating energy
offers for a specific trading interval are prevented from creating
an imbalance in the same interval.
To analyze this novel participation model, we took the
perspective of a VPP that includes both controllable and
stochastic generation units, and that trades in a two-settlement
electricity market. The Active/Passive offering strategy arises
as a three-stage decision making problem. We formulated this
problem as a MILP in which binary variables are introduced to
model the feasible operating region of conventional production
units and the complementarity between active and passive
participation in the balancing stage. Compared to an Active
and a Passive strategy, computational experiments showed that
an Active/Passive approach can result in a significantly higher
VPP expected profit (up to 8% higher). The analysis reveals
that the active participation is more attractive for the VPP in
the hourly intervals with limited production uncertainty from
the stochastic sources and profitable balancing market price
scenarios, and the passive one when highly uncertain renew-
able energy production is combined with narrow balancing
market price scenarios (i.e., close to the day-ahead price).
The proposed framework is potentially relevant from the
perspective of a system operator, who would benefit from
having more regulating energy available in real time, and can
be also seen as a lever to facilitate the integration of renewable
power sources through their aggregation into VPPs.
The focus of this work was to provide useful insights on
the proposed Active/Passive participation model. Therefore, we
presented a case study with 300 scenarios and a simplified
operating region of the dispatchable generators to keep the
model intuitive and solvable in about 30 minutes. Further
research may be in the direction of developing more efficient
algorithms capable of solving the model for a larger number
of scenarios or including more operating details of the units.
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